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In Contingency, irony and solidarity, Richard Rorty outlines his conception of the 
ideal liberal utopia, wherein moral change results from the substitution ofFreedom for 
Truth as "the goal of thinking and of social progress" (xiii). Rorty maintains that 
autonomous self-creation and human solidarity are not to be united in a "single vision" 
(xiv), but rather. "the closest we will come to joining these two quests is to see the aim of 
a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic, 'irrationalist', and aestheticist 
as they please so long as they do it on their own time" (xiv). Rorty charges Plato as being 
one who endorses the notion that Truth exists. an idealist account which (according to 
Rorty) entails beliefs such as the following: there is an essential human nature that might 
be defined. there are absolute standards to which we might appeal in order to make correct 
moral judgments, and there is an ultimate "final vocabulary" that will accurately describe 
'1he way things are". Rorty is a pragmatic relativist who is suspicious ofPlato and other 
idealists, and as an unfortunate consequence of this tension, Rorty fails to see that many of 
the practical consequences of Plato's philosophy are in fact very similar to those desired 
by Rorty himself 
As evidenced by his account of justice and a just society in the Republic, Plato 
shares many ofRorty's ideas about the most appropriate ways to discuss the concept of 
justice and how it would work in an ideal community. With respect to this topic, I will 
highlight the points of convergence that exist between Rorty' s and Plato's ways of 
thinking. I will then propose several descriptions of what exactly it is that one might be 
looking for when one seeks to transcend cultural differences in an attempt to promote 
human solidarity, which might ultimately prove compatible with both pragmatism and 
idealism. 
Rorty writes, "When I say 'we should do this or that 'we cannot' do that, I am not, 
of course, speaking from a neutral standpoint" (54). In fact, Rorty's conception of 
philosophy makes it impossible for anyone to be a neutral thinker, even if s/he would like 
to be. Rorty states, " ... there is no natural order of philosophic inquiry" (55), and "the 
creation of a new form of cultural life, a new vocabulary, will have its utility explained 
only retrospectively" (50). So even if we grant Rorty his notion that Plato's references to 
the ideal Truth demonstrates that Plato was a metaphysician, Rorty still has to say that 
Plato was: 
(I) simply starting his inquiries where he saw fit, and 
(2) creating a new vocabulary along the way, to be judged retrospectively. 
Admittedly, Rorty and Plato's theories do differ in principle: Plato allows Truth to enter 
into his account of the ideal just society, and Rorty does not. But Rorty, as a self-
proclaimed non-neutral thinker, will have to allow Plato's account to be equally as viable 
as his own. In other words, regardless of how Plato arrives at the ideas in the Republic, 
the bottom line is that he, like Rorty, is simply putting forth yet one more metaphor that 
redescribes justice and a just society. In fairness, then, Rorty can only say that 
pragmatism might be superior to (but not a replacement for) metaphysical idealism, in that 
it would be more likely to lead to a functional society. 
So what exactly would constitute a functional society, from Rorty's point of view? 
He writes: 
To sum up, the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of 
the contingency oftheir language of moral deliberation, and thus oftheir 
consciences, and thus oftheir community ... people who combined commitment 
with a sense ofthe contingency oftheir own commitment. (61) 
And in terms of a just society, Rorty agrees with John Rawls, who says: 
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What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent 
and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and 
our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions 
embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us (58). 
Rorty evidently places great stock in the pragmatism ofRawls, who, according to Rorty, 
has helped to "undermine the idea of a transhistorical'absolutely valid' set of concepts 
which would serve as 'philosophical foundations' of liberalism" (CIS 57). My suggestion 
is that Rorty would thereby endorse Rawls' concept of the 'veil of ignorance' and, 
furthermore, that Plato operates from a theoretical standpoint much like the one outlined 
by Rawls (i.e. from behind a veil of ignorance) when giving his account ofthe ideal 
society. Plato writes, "If we could watch a city coming to be in theory, wouldn't we also 
see its justice coming to be. and its injustice as well?" (43). It is precisely this sort of 
coming-to-be that Rawls proposes to observe from behind the veil of ignorance. Briefly, 
this 'veil of ignorance' is a metaphorical description of a knowledge-barrier that is in effect 
in a certain hypothetical situation, namely, when all rational beings have a meeting of the 
minds in order to produce a non-biased theory of justice. The goal is to theoretically 
develop a just society that could be presented to any rational person for consideration, and 
this same person would endorse it, believing that her chances for fmding happiness in this 
society were optimized, even without having the knowledge of which class she would fmd 
herself in. For example, most rational beings would not be likely to favor a society in 
which one individual had total authority while the rest of the citizens adhered to her every 
wish and command, over a society which allowed everyone to have a say in matters of 
consequence. 
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Rawls suggests that one of the primary purposes of the imaginary veil is to "nullify 
the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit 
social and natural circumstances to their own advantage" ( 136). In a similar attempt to 
avoid power struggles in his utopic society. Plato says that one important goal is "to see 
that the city as a whole has the greatest happiness" (95), thereby refuting Thrasymachus, 
who had argued that "justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (14). 
Rawls goes on to describe the (imaginary) ones assessing the principles of justice as 
follows: 
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know 
the basis of social organization and the laws ofhuman psychology. (137) 
Since it is Plato who is assessing the principles of justice in this case, we will examine his 
particular background with respect to the above description. Plato was obviously well 
aware of the political ideologies of his time, given his astute observations about the 
organization of the stratified societies in Greece and his familiarity with the particular 
needs of each class. He was also quite attuned to the emotional tensions that could arise if 
a particular sort of government were in effect, such as a tyranny or a democracy, to cite 
two examples. I believe that it is safe to say that he would meet Rawls' criteria for 
political savvy. Rawls then writes: 
The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms ofthe general consequences of 
their public recognition and universal application, it being assumed that they will 
be complied with by everyone. (138) 
In a similar vein, Plato asserts his belief that people gather in cities "to live as partners and 
helpers" (44) because they fmd communal living to be best. The implication ofthis is that 
the citizens are willing to comply with the principles of their societies, and thus we can 
speculate that they would behave in a similar manner in Plato's hypothetical society. 
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Moreover, according to Rawls. the individuals considering the theory of justice should 
"have a secure sense of their O\\n worth so that they have no desire to abandon any of their 
aims provided others have less means to further theirs" (144). Likewise, Plato writes, 
"we've heard many say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one's own work 
and not meddling with what isn't one's own" ( 1 08), and thus we can conclude that Rawls 
stipulation is actually inherent in Plato's account of justice. The main point ofthis 
comparison between Rawls and Plato is to show that Plato is operating with an assumed 
veil of ignorance, while still presuming (as does Rawls) that his resulting theory of a just 
society would be commonly accepted. I suspect that Rorty would favor such a move. as 
Plato also admits, "the true city. in my opinion. is the once we've described ... [but yet] the 
things I mentioned earlier and the way of life I described won't satisfY some people" ( 48). 
Plato does acknowledge that there is not a predetermined and universally accepted idea of 
a just society. This raises the question. however. of whether or not Rawls' plan is 
realistic, given that so far there has been no universal consensus on any description of an 
ideal just society. What would be a reason to even speculate that there could be any social 
organization that people would unanimously favor over all others? If we uphold Rawls' 
assumption that the decision-makers are rational beings, and ifwe add the further 
assumption that rational beings want to optimize their chances for self-preservation and 
positive interactions with other rational beings, then we can safely say that there must be a 
(hypothetical) society that will best promote such objectives. Basic human needs will be 
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accounted for, as well as outlets for common human desires such as love, physical fitness, 
artistic ventures, finanical security, and so ort. Rawls' plan is.to simply formulate an 
account of a society that will provide the greatest amount of contentment for the greatest 
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come upon a belief that we fmd more suitable. The evidence for this is the central claim 
in Chapter 1 of Contingency, irony and solidarity: 
... what matters in the end are changes in the vocabulary rather than changes in 
belief, changes in truth-value candidates rather than assignments of truth-value. 
(47) 
Socrates would have been willing to go along with this plan as well. When talking about 
corruption of the youth (this particular topic being irrelevant to the point I am trying to 
make) Socrates states: "Then. as the argument has demonstrated- and we must remain 
persuaded by it until someone shows us a better one-they mustn't behave like that" (64 ). It 
seems as though he is not being so dogmatic after all. 
One of the most distinct parallels between Rorty's and Plato's ideal societies is that 
both have as an undercurrent the notion that the avoidance of cruelty should be a common 
social goal. In the Introduction to CIS. Rorty writes: 
Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their 
own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humility ofhuman beings by 
other human beings by other human beings may cease (xv). 
Likewise, at the end of a discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus, Socrates asks, 
" ... for ithas become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone?'' (11) and 
Polemarchus affirms this conclusion. Rorty makes his case again when he later states that 
we should privatize any desires for autonomy, "in order to prevent [ourselves] from 
slipping into a political attitude which will lead [us] to think that there is some social goal 
more important than the avoidance of cruelty" ( 65). Similarly, Socrates poses another 
hypothetical question, asking Glaucon, "And wouldn't you think that the worst thing that 
someone.could do to this city is injustice?" (109). Given Socrates' definition of injustice, 
namely, meddling in another individual's affairs, renouncing human virtue, harming one's 
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friends, and the like, this amounts to saying that to either directly or indirectly harm a 
fellow citizen is an undesirable behavior. While Plato and Rorty do cite different 
examples of cruel and/or harmful behaviors, implicit in both perspectives is that we should 
strive to avoid causing unwarranted mental angst or physical pain in our fellow humans. 
Another point of comparison between Rorty and Plato stems from the notion that 
the youth of a society are quite impressionable in their moral conduct, and that as a result, 
we should carefully consider the effects of publicly available literature. Rorty expects that 
a literary critic will: 
... facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon of moral 
exemplars and advisers. and suggesting ways in which the tensions within this 
canon may be eased- or, where necessary, sharpened. (82) 
Plato himself takes on a similar role when he is discussing the content of stories about 
gods and heroes that future guardians of the kallipolis might hear during their training. 
Concerning the storytellers, Plato says, "'We'll select their stories whenever they are fine 
and beautiful and reject them when they aren't" (53). After citing several examples of 
passages that he fmds inappropriate, such as Wine-bibber, with the eyes of a dog and the 
heart of a deer (Achilles insulting his commander, Agamemnon) and Gifts persuade gods, 
and gifts persuade revered kings (source unknown), Plato concludes: 
... these stories are harmful to people who hear them, for everyone will be ready to 
excuse himself when he's bad, ifhe is persuaded that similar things both are being 
done now and have been done in the past. ( 68) 
Admittedly, Plato's promotion of radical censorship is more drastic than Rorty's 
suggestion that we merely revise the canon (not to the neglect of all other texts, which I 
take to be the_ primary difference), but both seem to believe that we should focus our 
attention on authors and critics who strive to sensitize readers to misconduct. 
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Rorty believes that Wilfrid Sellars' concept of'we-intentions' is a good starting 
point for moral reflection. In Science and Metaphysics, Sellars writes: 
It is a conceptual fact that people constitute a community, a we, by virtue of 
thinking of each other as one of us. and by willing the common good not under the 
species ofbenevolence- but by willing it as one of us. or from a moral point of 
view. (190) 
The ancientGreeks shared this kind of"we" and "they" mentality. as evidenced by a 
passage in the Republic wherein Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the nationalistic 
attitudes of their people. Socrates declares, "I say that· the Greek race is its own and akin. 
while the barbarians are strange and foreign" (145). As an offshoot to this kind mentality, 
Rorty says, "I want to deny that 'one of us human beings' can have the same force as ['our 
sort of people'. 'a comrade in the movement', 'a fellow Catholic', etc.]" (190). Rorty wants 
us to think of solidarity as "the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of 
tribe, religion, customs, and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with 
respect to pain and humiliation ... " ( 192). In a like manner, Socrates says, "the having of 
pains andpleasures in common is the greatest good for a city" (138) because such mutual 
feelings will bind the citizens together. Furthermore, Socrates speculates that the city he 
is founding will be full of good and civilized Greek citizens, who will treat foreigners as 
they treat each other. He says of the Greeks-to-be, "then they'll moderate their foes in a 
friendly spirit" (146) and "their attitude of mind should be that of people who'll one day be 
reconciled and who won't always be at war" (145). Neither Plato nor Rorty are naive 
enough to think that wars will not happen, but they share the attitude that (idealistically) it 
would be preferable to be tolerant of cultural differences and to live in a harmonious 
society. 
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The question is, then, how do we reconcile our tendency to think "we-mindedly" 
with our (Rorty-inspired) goal of transcending cultural differences? Perhaps we need to 
look for a larger '"we" than one that is primarily social or historical. What is it exactly that 
Rorty would be looking for, should he try to uncover what we have in common with other 
human beings? To recall, he suggests that what is important are our similarities with 
respect to pain and humiliation. This hints at a search for similarities that are biological 
and psychological in kind, as opposed to social or historical. In keeping with the idea that 
humans share certain biological and psychological states. we can now introduce Plato's 
notion of the tripartite soul, which he believes is common to all individuals. Each of the 
parts. namely, the rational part, the non-rational appetitive part. and the spirited part, 
correspond with distinct features ofthe kallipolis, namely. the rulers, the producers, and 
the guardians. respectively. In order for a human being to function well. just as for a city 
to function well, each of the three parts must be in harmony with the other two. 
Accordingly, this leads us to the description of a just person. much in the same way that 
Plato arrives at the concept of a just city. Plato states: 
One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part 
or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates 
well what is really his own and rules himself. (119) 
There are two things to be gleaned from this account. First, it seems as though we have 
highlighted Plato's elucidation ofthe concept of justice that is most congruent with a 
"deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations". Second, Plato has put forth a 
description of what he believes to be inherent in all human beings, which may, in fact, be 
just the tip of the iceberg with respect to what we have in common with other humans. 
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Rorty writes, "solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human 
essence, in all human beirigs'· ( 192). Rather, he says that the right way to construe the 
slogan 'We have obligations to human beings simply as such' is to say that it urges us "to 
create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have" (196) by trying to 
notice our similarities with people whom we currently think of as "they" rather than "us". 
If we are going to take seriously Rorty's plea for us to overlook cultural differences in our 
attempt to promote human solidarity, then it will be beneficial to delineate a set of 
biological and psychological human characteristics that seem to transcend political, social, 
cultural, and historical boundaries. Rorty would likely approve ofthe suggestion that 
there is not one fmite set of characteristics that is inherent in any and every person, but 
that instead. there is an infinite set of possible characteristics, certain of which are 
manifested in humans more commonly than the rest. And if we can divulge the particular 
characteristics that do appear most often, then we will have a clear idea of what we will 
most likely discover in our quest for human solidarity. 
Since Plato's time, there have been many and varied attempts to answer the 
question, What is it to be human?. Perhaps the best that we can do to answer this query is 
to approach it with a firm conviction that "human nature" is characterized by a vast 
number of what Wittgenstein calls "family resemblances", as he describes them in 
Philosophical Investigations. When considering all of the actual human natures that exist 
in the world (i.e. one "per human), Wittgenstein would say that "if you look at them you 
will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series ofthem at that" (PI 66). Thus, instead of attempting to describe the essence of 
human nature, as Plato would have us do, we should acknowledge that there is no single 
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trait that is common to all humans, and then we are at liberty to discuss ·human nature' in 
terms ofwhat characteristics are found in most people. Accordingly, it is not my intention 
to determine whether the philosophers cited in the remainder of this paper are correct or 
incorrect in their analyses of human nature, but rather I will assess their ideas by 
considering the extent to which the characteristics that they cite are manifested in the 
human species. 
Aristotle suggests that humans are distinguished from animals by the power of 
reason, which is what makes civilization possible. Hence. what we find in cities are 
citizens who gladly submit to the rule of the law, all aiming for a common good (although 
the conception of this good may vary from city to city). Accordingly, he says that we 
form communities larger than families or small villages in order to provide "the basic 
necessities oflife and the contex1 in which a good life can exist" (Trigg 32). What might 
be gleaned from this in relation to human solidarity is that the drive for a global 
community that is such a force in contemporary societies is simply an extension of our 
dependency on others for our own flourishing. In this context, Rorty's push for human 
solidarity is very much in tune with current thought, which is often international in scope, 
as we recognize that not onJy are we dependent on our own states and nations for the 
resources that we need, but also on the rest of the world. Although it is quite possible for 
an individual to survive independent from organized society, it is much more common for 
humans to gather together in villages, cities, and nation states in order to promote survival. 
Thomas Hobbes appeals to everyday experience to confirm his central claim about 
human behavior, "which is, quite simply, that we are all selfish, and willing to take 
advantage of others for our own gain" (Trigg 59). By the same token, he suggests that this 
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selfishness results from our drive for self-preservation, which is not to be judged under 
any code of morality, as it is simply 'the natural condition ofmankind' to be in 
competition for personal security. While it might seem. at first glance. that this 
characteristic would be an impediment to the creation of human solidarity, our awareness 
of it allows us to pinpoint good targets for social reform. In other words, ifwe understand 
that most people are self-interested above all else, then we know to approach them in 
order to promote our human solidarity cause. For example. one might work for a human 
rights organization under the pretense that if it makes people feel secure to know that they 
will have food, clothing, and shelter, then such provisions might eliminate part oftheir 
perceived need to be in a perpetual state of competition. In tum, this would seem to bring 
about more cooperative neighborhoods, towns. cities, nations. and so on. in keeping with 
the goal of solidarity. 
David Hume is also largely preoccupied with the idea ofwhat constitutes human 
nature. Hume stresses the role played by instinct in the lives of all human beings. He 
believed that "our preferences are fixed, and cannot be influenced by reason, or indeed by 
social pressure" (Trigg 76). A brief sketch of common human instincts might include 
hunger, sexual desire, the inclination to bear children, and self-preservation. Our 
recognition of the fundamental human drives allows us to assess various social situations 
in the world to judge whether or not they promote human flourishing. For example, when 
we hear that a poverty-stricken country such as Honduras has been demolished by a 
hurricane, we know exactly what to do in order to ensure that the citizens of Honduras 
have their basic human needs fulfilled. Large-scale relief efforts are likely a manifestation 
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of the fact that most of us have a sense of human solidarity that is sometimes based on 
personal instinctual experiences. 
Freud's view ofhuman nature is largely realized through his emphasis on sexuality 
as a motive for human action. as sexual motives are "the most potent forces in human life" 
(Trigg 139). He suggests that desire, and sexual desire in particular, is responsible for 
conflict within each individual. The way to keep desire in check, of course, is through the 
ego, or ·reason and common sense', which serves as the mediator between the super-ego 
and the id. Freud's tripartite division ofthe human personality is comparable to Plato's 
division ofthe soul into the rationaL spirited, and appetitive parts. If accepted, Freud's 
analysis would serve to explain many of the sentiments that we find in our fellow humans. 
For example. feelings of moral guilt arise as the super-ego, representing the claims of 
morality, comes into conflict with the ego. Anxiety comes about as the ego has to admit 
its weakness in the face of its '"three tyrannical masters, the external world, the super-ego, 
and the id" (Trigg 142). Ultimately, Freud agrees with Hume that "Reason can control, 
but never fmally dominate, our passions" (Trigg 143). In so far as this relates to human 
solidarity, our search for commonality might be influenced by the recognition that humans 
are instinctual creatures, at least in part. We will likely meet other human beings who 
experience difficulties in coming to terms with their sexuality, or with their fear of death, 
or with the tension between outside moral forces, such as the church or the state, and their 
own 'lower' passions. Such an understanding of the most common psychological states 
will give us a common bond when we encounter another human being for the first time, as 
we will be able to immediately assign probable causes (in terms of inner turmoil) oftheir 
preoccupations and/or neuroses. 
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Wittgenstein proposes that the main characteristic of humans is the use of 
language. We can usually trace an individual's language acquisition back to his or her 
society, so given that (on one interpretation of Wittgenstein) "Our humanity is both 
expressed in, and created by, language" (Trigg 139) it may be concluded that society 
ultimately determines what it is to be human. So, one way to create solidarity using 
language as the means is to encourage an individual to study the languages of cultures 
outside ofthe one(s) in which s/he lived during his or her developmental years. Any 
linguist will likely confirm that there is much to be learned by studying the language of 
another people. including their social priorities. gender relations, class divisions. and so 
on. Initially, we do not often have a spoken tongue in common with residents of different 
nations, but once we create the bridge, it allows for a great many discoveries about exactly 
what it is that our peoples have in common. 
In his essay "Freedom and Resentment", P.F. Strawson says that most of us attach 
very great importance to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, 
particularly those human beings with whom we have formed special relationships. In 
response to their "goodwill, affection, or esteem ... or their contempt, indifference, or 
malevolence ... " (5), we form reactive attitudes and feelings, such as gratitude and 
resentment, in accordance with whichever of the aforementioned attitudes we perceive. It 
seems as though we are safe in saying that people expect goodwill from their family 
members, colleagues, friends, and lovers, and when they do not find it, they become 
resentful. In a larger sense, most people seem to expect a measure of goodwill from their 
fellow man in general, and they will become hostile and resentful if they are not given 
their due. As this relates to our quest for human solidarity, it seems as though we will find 
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similarities among expectations in interpersonal relationships. from the very casual to the 
most intimate. Thus. when we meet someone for the first time. regardless of (what Rorty 
might call) ''tribal differences". we can presume that if we show goodwill towards this 
person. they will respond favorably, and if we are malevolent, then s/he will keep us at a 
distance, in which case we have failed to promote solidarity. 
With regards to human tendencies, Strawson makes another point that I find to be 
in harmony with a Rortian way of thinking. He states: 
Men makes for themselves pictures of ideal forms oflife ... and one and the same 
individual may be captivated by different and sharply conflicting pictures at 
different times. (26) 
He goes on to say that such idealistic pictures may include notions such as personal honor, 
contemplation. retreat, power, and ''simple human solidarity and cooperative endeavor'" 
(26). The bottom line is that "'any ofthese ideas, and a great many others too, may form 
the core and substance of a personal ideal'' (26 ). What might work for Rorty. in this case, 
is that we are not talking about the core and substance of a human, but rather, of a human 
ideal. What might urge each of us in the direction ofhuman solidarity, then, would be an 
uncovering of any dimensions of our ideal pictures that we have in common with other 
humans. Strawson goes on to say that "something approaching consistency, some more or 
less steady balance, is usually detectable in the pattern of an individual person's decisions 
and actions" (27). Were such consistency non-existent, it would be impossible to find any 
common threads among different individuals and cultures, as everyone would be in a state 
of perpetual change. For Rorty's plan to work, then, humans must generally be consistent 
in their thoughts and behaviors. As evidenced by the law and order that supervenes on 
most societies, this does seem to be the case. Our recognition of this tendency in our 
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fellow humans to adhere to certain ideals is itse(f a discovery of something that we have in 
common with them. in addition to the fact that quite often. we find that we have similar 
goals. 
There is obviously not one model of the human experience that completely 
encompasses all ofthe aforementioned human tendencies. Nonetheless. it does seem as 
though the philosophers cited have uncovered the tendencies that do appear most 
frequently in all societies ofthe world. My main concern with Rorty's account of human 
solidarity is that he gives us very little guidance in our search for this solidarity, aside 
from the recognition that we all share a capacity for pain and humiliation. The "typical'' 
human experience obviously has many more dimensions than pain and humiliation. 
Furthermore, concepts like 'humiliation' seem to speak of some sort ofhigher moral 
order, in so far as there must be an accepted standard ofbehavior in order for 'humiliation' 
to have any meaning in the first place. 
Plato might have to concede (were he still alive) that there is no one complete and 
accurate account of'human nature', given that the debate still continues about what 
exactly it means to be human. Rorty, meanwhile, would have done well to provide a more 
detailed account ofwhat might be formulated during the creation of human solidarity. A 
compromise between our idealist and our pragmatist might be that we create solidarity as 
we bring into the open the characteristics that we seem to have in common with other 
humans, in an attempt to ultimately elucidate as many shared human features as possible. 
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